Poison Pill Finance Wiki
Poison Pill: A Financial Defense
A "poison pill," also known as a shareholder rights plan, is a defensive tactic used by a company's board of directors to deter a hostile takeover attempt. It aims to make the company less attractive to a potential acquirer, either by significantly increasing the cost of the takeover or by diluting the acquirer's ownership stake.
How it Works
The core mechanism involves issuing rights or warrants to existing shareholders (excluding the potential acquirer) that become exercisable under specific triggering conditions, typically when an acquirer reaches a certain ownership threshold (e.g., 10-20% of the company's stock). These rights generally allow shareholders to purchase additional shares of the company at a significantly discounted price. This action dramatically increases the number of outstanding shares, diluting the acquirer's ownership and making the takeover much more expensive.
Another common type of poison pill is a "flip-in" pill, where existing shareholders (excluding the acquirer) can purchase the company's shares at a discount. A "flip-over" pill allows shareholders to buy shares of the acquiring company at a discount if the merger goes through. This tactic dilutes the acquirer's stock and makes the acquisition less desirable.
Types of Poison Pills
- Flip-in Pill: Allows existing shareholders (excluding the acquirer) to purchase the company's shares at a discount.
- Flip-over Pill: Allows shareholders to purchase shares of the acquiring company at a discount if the merger goes through.
- Dead-hand Pill: (Controversial and generally invalid) Restricts the ability to redeem the pill to only certain directors, effectively entrenching the current board.
Purpose and Effects
The primary purpose of a poison pill is to protect the company and its shareholders from coercive or opportunistic takeover attempts. It buys the board time to evaluate the offer, negotiate a better deal, or seek alternative strategies, such as finding a "white knight" (a more desirable acquirer).
However, poison pills are controversial. Critics argue they can entrench management and prevent shareholders from receiving a premium for their shares in a legitimate takeover offer. They can also discourage potential acquirers from even making an offer, effectively shielding the company from market discipline.
Legal Considerations
The legality and implementation of poison pills vary by jurisdiction. In the United States, the Delaware courts have played a significant role in shaping the rules governing their use. Courts generally apply a "business judgment rule," giving deference to the board's decision as long as it acts in good faith and with reasonable care. However, courts can also intervene if the pill is deemed to be used to entrench management or unfairly disadvantage shareholders.
Poison pills are not permanent. They typically have a sunset clause, expiring after a certain period. They can also be redeemed by the board of directors at any time, allowing them to accept a fair takeover offer.
Conclusion
The poison pill is a powerful and complex financial defense mechanism. While it can protect shareholders from unfair takeover tactics, it also carries the risk of entrenching management and preventing value-creating acquisitions. Its use requires careful consideration and should be evaluated in the context of the specific circumstances of the company and the takeover attempt.